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This paper provides a set of simple, yet overlooked, facts regarding on-the-job search
and job-to-job transitions using the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is unique
in that it asks employed workers whether they search on the job and, if so, why. I
ﬁnd that workers search on the job for very diﬀerent reasons, which lead to diﬀerent
outcomes in both mobility and wage growth. A nontrivial fraction of workers engage
in on-the-job search due to a fear of losing their job. This group mimics many known
features of unemployed workers, such as wage losses upon ﬁnding a job. Workers also
search on the job because they are unsatisﬁed. This group is roughly equally split into
those who are unsatisﬁed with pay and those who are unsatisﬁed with other aspects
of their job. Distinguishing these two groups allows me to highlight the importance of
the nonpecuniary value of a job. I further show that the evidence that ﬁrms make a
counteroﬀer in response to a worker’s outside oﬀer is scarce and that wage outcomes at
the time of job-to-job transitions are closely linked to the worker’s outside option. The
evidence in this paper contributes not only to deepening our understanding of labor
reallocation, but it also suggests the fruitful directions of future research in the labor
search literature.
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11 Introduction
Job-to-job transitions are considered one of the key economic processes whereby labor is
reallocated toward more productive uses (Topel and Ward (1992)). Traditional labor search
models assume that job search is a distinct activity and thus “unemployment” is the only
state in which a worker can look for a job. Researchers have long recognized the limitation of
this approach. Recent literature puts more and more emphasis on on-the-job search (OJS)
and job-to-job transitions by extending the traditional approach. One reason for this trend is
the simple fact that job-to-job transitions account for a majority of labor market transitions.
However, one key problem of the literature, in my view, is that it lacks the direct empirical
assessment of OJS behavior and its relationship to observed job-to-job transitions. This
paper ﬁlls this important gap by providing a comprehensive picture of OJS and job-to-job
transitions using the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). This data set is unique in the sense
that it asks employed workers whether they engage in OJS and, if so, why every quarter.
There is now a relatively rich literature that brings together search models with OJS
and the labor market data. This sometimes takes the form of structural estimation, and the
estimated model is often used for policy experiments. However, misspeciﬁcation of the model
could result from the lack of knowledge about simple facts on OJS, biasing the parameter
estimates, which in turn aﬀects its quantitative (thus policy) implications. This seems to be
a legitimate concern, at least a priori, especially because models of OJS sometimes rely on
rather stark assumptions. For example, the literature that has evolved from Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) often features the equilibrium mechanism, by which poaching is the source
of wage growth and diﬀerentiation of the same workers.1 In another branch of the literature
(Mortensen (1994) and Pissarides (2000, chap.4)), which is oriented more toward macroeco-
nomic issues, researchers often make the no-recall assumption that when an employed worker
receives an outside oﬀer and negotiates with the new employer, the worker’s outside option
is the value of unemployment (not the value of employment at the current ﬁrm). Further-
more, none of the existing papers (as far as I know) consider basic moments such as what
fraction of employed workers are looking for a job and what the job ﬁnding rates of these
workers are. Thus, providing the basic facts regarding OJS, job-to-job transitions, and wage
transitions not only contributes to a better understanding of the labor reallocation process
but also helps to suggest fruitful directions of future quantitative and theoretical work in the
literature.
This paper is related to the empirical literature that analyzes labor market ﬂows.2 For
the US, Fallick and Fleischman (2004) present the ﬁrst comprehensive results on job-to-
job transitions based on the Current Population Survey (CPS). They also present a one-
shot picture of the OJS behavior of employed workers, using the CPS’s supplemental data.
Information the supplemental data covers only a short time window and is quite limited
in its contents. Nagypal (2008) measures job-to-job transitions using the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP). She breaks down job-to-job transitions by the diﬀerent
1The literature includes Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), Cahuc et al. (2006) and Yamaguchi (2010).
2The discussion here focuses on the research that pays at least some attention to job-to-job transitions.
2reasons for transitions. However, the SIPP does not include information regarding OJS
behavior.3 For the UK, Bell and Smith (2002) and Gomes (2009) also use the LFS and do
present some basic facts on OJS and job-to-job transitions observed in the LFS. However,
these papers are meant to provide an overview of the UK labor market and thus do not
undertake an in-depth analysis. There is another branch of literature that studies OJS in
the 80s and early 90s (e.g., Black (1981), Kahn and Low (1984), Holzer (1987), and Parsons
(1991) for the US and Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994) for the UK). These studies focus
mostly on the determinants of the OJS decision. On the other hand, this paper looks at
much broader issues. One of the issues I pay a close attention to is the implications of OJS
on workers’ wage transitions. This is important for at least two reasons. First, as found
by a seminal paper by Topel and Ward (1992), job-to-job transitions explain a signiﬁcant
portion of earnings growth over workers’ career. They argue that their ﬁnding suggests the
importance of search frictions in labor market allocation. Linking OJS behavior with wage
transitions allows me to shed further light on this important ﬁnding. Second, the wage
determination mechanism is an integral part of modern theories of OJS as I alluded to in
the previous paragraph.
The next section ﬁrst presents the basic facts regarding OJS and associated worker transi-
tions after describing the underlying data, the LFS. On average, roughly 4% of the working-
age population in the UK engaged in OJS over the period between 2002Q2 and 2009Q1.
Among those who search on the job, roughly 12% do so because they are afraid of losing
their job; 50% do so because they are unsatisﬁed with their job.4 Importantly, this group is
further split roughly equally into two groups: those who are unsatisﬁed with pay and those
who are unsatisﬁed with other (nonpecuniary) aspects. Throughout this paper, I emphasize
how diﬀerent the outcomes of OJS are between these diﬀerent groups of workers. Note also
that job-to-job transitions occur without OJS. However, the job-to-job transition rate of
those who search is dramatically higher than that without OJS (12.3% vs. 1.5% per quar-
ter). Note that this ﬁnding, together with the fact that a relative small fraction of employed
workers undertake OJS, suggests that OJS is costly. I also ﬁnd that the job loss rate (the
employment-to-unemployment transition rate) is signiﬁcantly higher for those who engage
in OJS. This is true not only for afraid OJS workers but also for unsatisﬁed OJS workers.5
Section 3 runs multinomial regressions for transition outcomes (job-to-job transitions,
stay at the same ﬁrm, become unemployed, and drop out of the labor force) using the sample
of employed workers, controlling for workers’ observable characteristics including their OJS
status by reasons. The regressions allow me to estimate how the relationship between the
OJS status and mobility pattern diﬀers by these observable characteristics, among which I
focus on ﬁrm tenure and ﬁrm size. It is known that worker separation rates decline with
ﬁrm tenure (e.g., Anderson and Meyer (1994)). I ﬁnd the same relationship among on-the-
job seekers, but the relationship is much more pronounced. Short-tenure workers who are
3Another related paper for the US labor market includes Bjelland et al. (2008).
4The remaining fraction corresponds to “other reasons.” This paper concentrates on the afraid group
and the unsatisﬁed group.
5Note that this last fact, while not surprising, implies some history dependence on the evolution of match
quality, which is often neglected in theories of OJS.
3engaged in OJS have very low job retaining probabilities: OJS workers with a fear of losing
their job have the lowest job retaining probability (e.g., 35% for workers with a tenure of less
than 3 months). The same is true for unsatisﬁed OJS workers. Their job retaining probability
is much higher (e.g., 65% for workers with a tenure of less than 3 months) compared with
afraid OJS workers but is much lower than that of those who do not search (which is roughly
90% when tenure is less than 3 months). Recent theories of OJS often use diﬀerences in ﬁrm
productivities as a driver of job-to-job transitions. The LFS does not include information
on ﬁrm productivities. However, it does ask about each worker’s ﬁrm size. I ﬁnd only weak
evidence that OJS workers at smaller ﬁrms have higher separation probabilities.
Section 4 considers how the OJS status itself is related to observable characteristics.
Again, the discussion focuses on ﬁrm tenure and size. I ﬁnd a hump-shape pattern in the
probabilities of becoming unsatisﬁed on-the-job seekers; the probability of engaging in OJS
slightly increases for the ﬁrst year and then sharply drops after 2-5 years of tenure. This
pattern is consistent with the idea that learning about the match quality takes some time. On
the contrary, the probability of becoming afraid on-the-job seekers declines monotonically
over ﬁrm tenure. This ﬁnding, together with the monotonically increasing job retaining
probability of these afraid OJS workers, conforms well with the earlier literature that reports
the incidence of multiple job losses of short-tenure workers (e.g., Stevens (1997)).
Section 5 moves on to the analysis of wage transitions. My attempt here is to infer some
wage implications of OJS not only on job-to-job movers but also on stayers who have a recent
history of undertaking an OJS. The analysis of stayers is motivated by some theories of OJS,
in which ﬁrms can respond to oﬀers made to their workers. In particular, a worker can reject
the outside oﬀer, as a result of a pay raise at the current ﬁrm. It is not possible for me
to directly test this implication, since the LFS does not contain any information regarding
job oﬀers. However, I can ask the following question: Are stayers with a recent history
of continuous OJS systematically paid better than stayers without OJS? First, I ﬁnd weak
evidence supporting this hypothesis. However, when the ﬁrm-size eﬀect is incorporated into
the regressions, the relationship largely disappears.6 This conﬁrms the anecdotal evidence
that ﬁrms tend not to respond to outside oﬀers.
On the other hand, job-to-job movers experience statistically signiﬁcant larger wage gains
(compared with stayers who do not have a recent history of OJS) as found by Topel and
Ward (1992). However, I ﬁnd large heterogeneity between diﬀerent groups of job-to-job
movers. First, job-to-job transitions associated with a fear of job loss result in wage loss,
which is consistent with the ﬁndings in the literature that looks at the earnings transitions
of displaced workers (e.g., Ruhm (1991) and Jacobson et al. (1993)). Second, the wage
gains of the two groups within unsatisﬁed OJS workers diﬀer considerably. Not surprisingly,
the workers who are unsatisﬁed with their pay experience large wage gains. While those
unsatisﬁed with nonpecuniary aspects also experience wage gains, but the size is roughly
40% lower than those of the ﬁrst group. I also ﬁnd that wage gains associated with job-to-
job transitions without OJS are even smaller. This ﬁnding conﬂicts with a view that talented
workers move to high-paying jobs without explicit OJS. These results are robust with respect
6In this section, I exclude afraid OJS workers from the analysis and focus on unsatisﬁed OJS workers.
4to the inclusion of the ﬁrm eﬀect. The heterogeneity highlighted here suggests that tightly
linking job-to-job transitions with wage gains represents an overly simpliﬁed view of labor
markets. In fact, the literature has shown that models with OJS have diﬃculties accounting
for observed wage losses upon job-to-job transitions (e.g., Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)
and Connolly and Gottschalk (2008)). One explanation oﬀered in the literature is that a
worker accepts wage cuts upon job-to-job transition when moving to a more productive ﬁrm
that oﬀers larger room for future pay increases. The ﬁnding here suggests that the simple
fact that there are a large number of OJS workers with a fear of losing their job or who
are unsatisﬁed with the nonpecuniary value of their job constitute one of the main reasons
for observed wage cuts upon job-to-job transitions.7 In the main text, I further discuss the
implications of these ﬁndings. Section 6 concludes the paper by suggesting directions of
future research.
2 Data and Basic Facts
Analysis of this paper uses the Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the UK. The LFS polls around
50,000 private households every quarter regarding various socioeconomic and employment
issues, including age, ethnicity, gender, employment status, tenure, occupation, industry, and
whether and why an individual is looking for a new job. The last two pieces of information are
the key ingredients of this paper. The survey is conducted by the Oﬃce of National Statistics
(ONS). The quarterly survey generally covers a sample of around 120,000 individuals and is
used for the UK oﬃcial monthly labor market statistics such as the unemployment rate.
An important feature of the LFS is that respondents continue to partake in the question-
naire for ﬁve consecutive quarters.8 While the main use of the LFS is to provide monthly
labor market statistics for the UK using the cross-sectional information, the ONS recognizes
the usefulness of the longitudinal aspect of the survey and thus releases two- and ﬁve-quarter
linked data sets, on which my results are based. Every cross-sectional data set is matched
with the data set one or four quarters ahead using a personal identiﬁcation variable. The
individuals that could not be matched are dropped from the longitudinal data sets. Popula-
tion weights are calculated separately for each longitudinal data set so that each data set is
nationally representative on its own.9 Each of the two-quarter and ﬁve-quarter longitudinal
data sets includes roughly 45,000 and 7,500 observations, respectively. Most of the analyses
below restrict the sample to males who are 25 years of age or older. Note that earnings
are asked only in the incoming and outgoing quarters (i.e., respondents’ ﬁrst and ﬁfth inter-
views). My analysis in Section 5 uses the ﬁve-quarter datas sets since wage transitions are
the main focus in that section. The two-quarter data set is used in the rest of the paper.
7The importance of the amenity value of a job is also emphasized, for example, by Nosal and Rupert
(2007) and Bonhomme and Jolivet (forthcoming)
8There are ﬁve rotation groups in the survey. Within each rotation group, respondents are distributed
uniformly across the three-month period. Each respondent participates in the survey every three months.
9Clarke and Tate (1999) discuss various measurement issues in constructing the longitudinal data sets
and how the ONS deals with them.
5Table 1: Labor Market Status
Employed Unemployed Out of
No Search Search Labor Force
Total 0.705 0.041 0.042 0.212
(0.055)
Male, 25 or older 0.789 0.043 0.038 0.136
(0.050)
Notes: Expressed as a fraction to the working-age population. Fraction to total
employment is in parentheses. Based on two-quarter longitudinal data set of the
Labour Force Survey. Sample period: 2002Q2–2009Q1. Sample size: 1,172,930
(all), 501,158 (25+ males).
The sample period starts in 2002Q2 for both data sets, since the consistent information is
available from that point on without any breaks in the data. The last observations for the
two-quarter and ﬁve-quarter longitudinal data sets are for 2009Q1 and 2009Q4, respectively.
2.1 Basic Facts on OJS
In this section, I provide a set of summary statistics. Since the overall picture of worker
ﬂows in the UK is already well known (e.g., see Bell and Smith (2002), Gomes (2009), and
Smith (2010)), I focus exclusively on transitions relevant to the OJS behavior.
First, Table 1 presents the population weights of the four labor market statuses: searching
while employed, employed with no search, unemployed, and out of the labor force. According
to the data, roughly 4% of the working-age population in the UK engage in active job search
while employed. One way to appreciate the size of this group may be to compare it with
the size of the unemployment pool. From this perspective, it is roughly the same size as the
unemployment pool. The direct implication of the fact that only a small fraction of workers
engage in OJS is that OJS is quite costly. If OJS were not costly, then everybody would
always engage in OJS, seeking better opportunities.
As mentioned above, there is no oﬃcial data source in the US that regularly asks about
OJS activities. But the supplements to the February 1997 and February 1999 CPS (Current
Population Survey) collected some information regarding OJS behavior. Using the informa-
tion, Fallick and Fleischman (2004) report that 4.4% of employed workers search on the job.
The corresponding share for the UK is 5.5%. Given the diﬀerences in the sample periods
between the two data sets, the two numbers are largely in line with each other. Also observe
in Table 1 that males who are 25 years of age or older have a somewhat smaller share of
on-the-job seekers relative to employment. This makes sense in that this group typically has
a stronger attachment to their employer.
Next, Table 2 presents the breakdown of OJS by reasons. The on-the-job seekers are split
6Table 2: Distribution of Reasons for On-the-Job Search
Afraid of Unsatisﬁed with Other
losing job pay other reasons
Total 0.124 0.210 0.267 0.399
Male, 25 or older 0.132 0.239 0.279 0.349
Notes: The “unsatisﬁed with other” category includes (i) journey
unsatisfactory in present job, and (ii) other aspects of present job
unsatisfactory. The “other reasons” category includes (i) present job to
ﬁll time before ﬁnding another, (ii) wants longer hours than in present
job, and (iii) wants shorter hours than in present job. Sample period:
2002Q1–2009Q1. Sample size: 44,512 (all), 19,465 (25+ males).
into four categories, depending the reason for search.10 There are a couple of interesting facts.
First, a nontrivial fraction of workers engage in OJS because they are afraid of losing their
job. This reason is economically very diﬀerent from the other groups of on-the-job seekers.
For example, reservation wages of these workers would be lower. This issue will be discussed
in Section 5. Existing theories of OJS and job-to-job transitions do not deal with these
economically diﬀerent workers. The omission can be a source of misguidance of any policy
implications derived from the model. Another important piece of information in this table is
that the group of unsatisﬁed on-the-job seekers is equally split into those who are unhappy
about pay and those who are unhappy about the nonpecuniary aspects of their job. Existing
theoretical models of labor turnover typically abstract away from the fact that workers can
trade oﬀ wages for amenities or vice versa.11 Throughout this paper, I will elaborate on the
heterogeneities between on-the-job seekers and nonseekers and between the diﬀerent groups
of workers within on-the-job seekers.
2.2 OJS and Worker Transitions
Table 3 looks at unconditional transition probabilities. The table reports the quarterly
transition rates of each type of workers in each row into the labor market status in each
column. The result further illustrates the heterogeneities across diﬀerent types of worker in
terms of the transition outcomes. First, consider the diﬀerence between those who search
and do not search. The job ﬁnding rates for these two groups greatly diﬀer from each other
(12.3 % vs. 1.5%). This implies that the search intensity (search vs. no search) matters a
lot. Another interesting fact is that the transition rates into unemployment are also higher
for those who search on the job. This pattern can be consistent with a situation in which the
current match quality (or productivity) evolves over time with history dependence. Suppose
that the match quality deteriorates gradually over time and that the worker engages in OJS.
10The original choices includes seven reasons. See notes to Table 2 for how I reclassify them.
11Of course, it is not that the literature completely ignores the importance of nonpecuniary aspects. I will
discuss this later in the paper.
7Table 3: Unconditional Transition Rates
Outcome in t + 1
Status in t Same Job New Job Unemployed Inactive
Employed
No Search 0.967 0.015 0.008 0.009
Search 0.816 0.123 0.046 0.015
Afraid 0.650 0.183 0.137 0.031
Unsatisﬁed (pay) 0.861 0.103 0.028 0.008
Unsatisﬁed (other) 0.869 0.097 0.025 0.008
Other Reasons 0.806 0.136 0.040 0.018
Notes: Males, 25 years of age or older. Based on two-quarter longitudinal Labour Force Survey.
Sample period: 2002Q1–2009Q1. Transition rates are calculated by dividing each worker ﬂow
from one state in t to another state in t + 1 by the stock of workers in the originating state in t.
See notes to Table 2 for more details on reasons for OJS.
In this case, it is possible that before ﬁnding a new job, the match quality deteriorates further
to the point where separation into unemployment occurs. Note that this type of evolution of
match productivity is excluded when match productivity follows the Poisson process, which
is often assumed in the literature.
The following four rows in Table3 present transition rates by diﬀerent reasons. First note
that the higher transition rate into unemployment for all on-the-job seekers does not simply
result from the higher employment-to-unemployment transition rate of afraid workers. Even
among unsatisﬁed on-the-job seekers, this pattern holds. Next, observe that afraid workers
not only have a higher transition rate into unemployment but also a higher transition rate
into a new job, compared to the other groups. There are at least two possible explanations
for this. First, reservation wages for afraid workers are lower and consequently, new job oﬀers
are more likely to be accepted. Another contributing factor could be that search intensity
of these workers is higher. Lastly, the two unsatisﬁed groups, whether in regard to pay or
other aspects, are similar with respect to the transition rates. As I will show later, however,
these two groups diﬀer signiﬁcantly with respect to their wage transitions.
Note also that researchers sometimes make loose connections between quitting a job and
job-to-job transitions, and between layoﬀs and employment-to-unemployment transitions.
Table 3 highlights the fact that these connections often fail to hold.12 For example, workers
who are afraid of losing their job make job-to-job transitions at a much higher rate than other
groups. It is far-fetched to call these transitions “quits.” Similarly, those who look for another
job while employed have a much higher chance that they separate into unemployment. This
ﬂow corresponds to “quits into unemployment.” Note that the size of these ﬂows are not
trivial and that their omission can be another source of misspeciﬁcation of the model.
12Nagypal (2008) also makes this point based on the reasons for job separations using the SIPP data for
the US.
8Table 4: Average Predicted Transition Rates: No Search vs. Search
Status in t
Outcome in t + 1
Same Job New Job Unemployed Inactive
Not Searching
0.968 0.016 0.008 0.009
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Searching
0.861 0.092 0.032 0.016
(0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
Notes: Males, 25 years of age or older. Averages of all workers’ predicted
transition rates in the sample. Standard errors are in parentheses and calcu-
lated by the delta method. R2= 0.103; sample size: 312,438; sample period:
2002Q2 to 2009Q1.
3 Conditional Evidence
I now estimate transition probabilities using the multinomial logit model, controlling for
workers’ observable characteristics. I then discuss how the transition probabilities vary
systematically with some of the important observable characteristics by computing average
predicted probabilities. I use the two-quarter longitudinal data set and the sample of males
of 25 years of age or older who are employed in the ﬁrst period t of the two. The dependent
variable is the labor market status in t + 1. Let si ∈ {Es,En,U,N} be the labor market
state of individual i in t + 1. Each element represents (i) employed at the same job, (ii)
employed at a diﬀerent job, (iii) unemployed, and (iv) not in the labor force, respectively. I
estimate the following multinomial logit model with the four outcomes:









where Xi is a vector of observable characteristics in the ﬁrst period, including the worker’s
search status and φj is a vector of coeﬃcients on Xi for outcome j. The variables in Xi are:
time dummies, education dummies (7 categories), ﬁrm size (5 categories), ﬁrm tenure (8
categories), age, age squared, industry dummies (10 categories), and occupation dummies (9
categories). First, to illustrate the heterogeneity that I pointed out in the previous section,
I ﬁrst estimate the model splitting the employed workers into only two groups, those who
engage in OJS and those who do not in t, and then estimate the model where the OJS
group is split into three groups: (i) those who are afraid of losing their job, (ii) those who
are unsatisﬁed with their job, and (iii) those who engage in OJS for other reasons. Here,
those who are unsatisﬁed with pay and other aspects are lumped together since there were
no noticeable diﬀerences between these two groups in terms of average predicted transition
probabilities.
9Table 5: Predicted Average Transition Rates by Reasons for OJS
Outcome in t + 1
Status in t Same Job New Job Unemployed Inactive
Not Searching
0.968 0.016 0.008 0.009
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Search
Afraid
0.714 0.155 0.099 0.032
(0.015) (0.012) (0.009) (0.004)
Unsatisﬁed
0.885 0.085 0.020 0.011
(0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001)
Other Reasons
0.879 0.080 0.023 0.019
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002)
Notes: Male, 25 years or older. Averages of all workers’ predicted transition rates in
the sample. Standard errors are in parentheses and calculated by the delta method.
R2= 0.107; sample size: 312,438; sample period: 2002Q2 to 2009Q1.
3.1 Average Predicted Transition Rates
Table 4 reports the average predicted transition probabilities across all employed workers.13
Compared with the ﬁrst two rows in Table 3, conditioning on the observable characteris-
tics does not alter the overall result: transition probabilities diﬀer dramatically, depending
on whether or not workers engage in OJS, although the exact ﬁgures change signiﬁcantly
(especially for those who search).
Table 5 shows the predicted average transition rates by reasons for OJS. Again, the results
are little changed compared with the unconditional results. This rules out the possibility
that the unconditional pattern is driven by the correlation between the search status and
some other observable characteristics (say, the afraid OJS group is entirely represented by
less-educated workers).
3.2 Firm Tenure and Size
Having estimated the multinomial logit model, I now examine how the transition probabilities
vary with observable characteristics. I focus on the two variables: ﬁrm tenure and ﬁrm size.
It is well known that the job separation rate declines with ﬁrm tenure (Anderson and Meyer
(1994)). I further look into how this empirical regularity is related to OJS. Note also that
recent theories of OJS emphasize that job-to-job transitions entail that workers move from
low productivity ﬁrms to high productivity ﬁrms (e.g, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)).
Because the theories often have a tight link between the productivity level and ﬁrm size
13Note that these are calculated as averages of predicted probabilities of individual workers, which diﬀer
from transition probabilities of the average individual because of the nonlinearity of the multinomial logit
model.
10(a) Same Job


































Figure 1: Predicted Transition Rates by Firm Tenure
Notes: Predicted average transition rates for each group of workers. The bars around the lines
represent the 95% conﬁdence intervals. Also see notes to Table 5. “Total” refers to all employed
workers.
(e.g., Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2008)), I use the ﬁrm-size variable to see how strong the
link between ﬁrm-size variable and the job-to-job transitions is. The analysis focuses on the
following three transition probabilities: (a) stay at the same ﬁrm, (b) move to a new job,
and (c) become unemployed.
First, Figure 1 presents three transition rates by tenure. Panel (a) shows that the proba-
bility of staying at (leaving) the ﬁrm increases (declines) almost monotonically, as Anderson
and Meyer (1994) report for the US labor market. However, underlying this pattern are large
diﬀerences between workers who are engaged in OJS and who are not engaged in OJS, and
within the group of on-the-job seekers.14 In particular, short-tenure workers that are afraid
of losing their job are retained at very low probabilities. For example, the job retention rate
of the afraid workers with tenure of less than 3 months is less than 40%. The same is true
for unsatisﬁed low-tenure workers although the retention rates are higher across all tenure
lengths.
The papers that rely on administrative records, including Anderson and Meyer (1994),
often do not distinguish between the diﬀerent types of separations (e.g., job-to-job transitions
vs. employment-to-unemployment transitions). Panels (b) and (c) of Figure 1 graph two of
the three components of separations: separation into a new job and separation into unem-
ployment. The two panels show that very high separation rates among short-tenure workers
who are afraid are divided roughly equally into job-to-job transition rates and employment-
to-unemployment transition rates. On the other hand, the separation rates among the
unsatisﬁed OJS workers disproportionately come from job-to-job transition rates.
As a summary of Figure 1, I would like to stress one important point. As I mentioned
14In the ﬁgure, “total” refers to the average transition rates for all employed workers, including those with
and without OJS. In terms of the number of transitions, those associated with workers who are not engaging
OJS dominate, and thus “total” is close to “no search.”
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Figure 2: Predicted Transition Rates by Firm Size
Notes: Predicted average transition rates for each group of workers. The bars around the lines
represent the 95% conﬁdence intervals. Also see notes to Table 5.
before, the existing empirical literature has already shown the monotonic increase in the
retention rates as job tenure becomes longer. However, the upward trend in the retention
rate is much more dramatic among those who search on the job. Observe that the blue solid
line, which represents the retention rates for all employed workers, is quite close to the green
dashed line, which represents the retention rates for workers who do not search. This implies
that, in terms of the size of turnover, separations associated with workers without OJS
are dominant. However, if the OJS activity embodies a resource cost necessary for a more
eﬃcient labor allocation, worker transitions resulting from OJS would be more economically
relevant than those without OJS. In this regard, the dramatic diﬀerences in the retention
rates among on-the-job seekers across all tenures entails an economically important ﬁnding.
Furthermore, as I will show in Section 5, the wage transitions of workers with OJS are
considerably diﬀerent from those of workers who are not involved in OJS.
Figure 2 breaks down the transition rates by ﬁrm size. Overall, it is clear that the rela-
tionship between transition rates and ﬁrm size is not tight. Again, workers with OJS (afraid
and unsatisﬁed OJS) are much more likely to separate from their employers. The destina-
tion of afraid OJS workers is roughly equally divided into a new job and the unemployment
pool, whereas unsatisﬁed OJS workers are much more likely to land in a new job rather than
the unemployment pool. However, there is little discernible pattern in relation to ﬁrm size.
For example, although there is a slight tendency for retention rates to increase with ﬁrm
size, statistical signiﬁcance is quite weak as can be inferred from the wide overlapping error
bands.15
15Anderson and Meyer (1994) also look at the ﬁrm-size eﬀect estimating the linear probability models and
ﬁnd that, relative to the largest ﬁrm-size category (2,000 workers or more), workers at smaller ﬁrms have
higher separation rates that are statistically signiﬁcant. However, within the categories comparable to the
size categories available in the LFS, the ﬁrm-size eﬀects are quite small. In this sense, the result in this
paper is consistent with theirs.
12(a) Firm Tenure





























Figure 3: Predicted OJS by Firm Tenure and Size
Notes: Predicted average probabilities for each group of workers. Bars around lines represent the
95% conﬁdence intervals. See also notes to Table 5.
4 Who Looks for Jobs?
In the previous section, I focused on how transition rates are related to the existence of OJS
and its reasons. This section analyzes the characteristics of those who engage in OJS. This
issue has been studied by several researchers in the 80s and early 90s.16 The analysis here
is, therefore, relatively brief.
Using the same two-quarter longitudinal LFS data, I estimate another multinomial re-
gression, where the multiple OJS statuses (i.e., no OJS, afraid OJS, unsatisﬁed OJS, and
OJS for other reasons) are regressed on observable characteristics that include the same ob-
servable variables as in the previous section: time dummies, education dummies, ﬁrm size,
ﬁrm tenure, age, age squared, industry dummies, and occupation dummies.
4.1 Relationship with Firm Tenure and Size
As in the previous section, I focus on the predicted probabilities by ﬁrm tenure and size.
Figure 3 plots the predicted probabilities of engaging in afraid OJS and unsatisﬁed OJS.
Panel (a) shows that these two groups diﬀer considerably in terms of their relationship
with tenure: The probability of afraid OJS is declining almost monotonically in tenure,
whereas that of unsatisﬁed OJS follows a hump-shaped pattern. The pattern of afraid OJS is
consistent with the idea of multiple job losses of short-tenure workers (Stevens (1997)) when
combined with the result in Figure 1 that afraid workers are much more likely to transit
to the unemployment pool or another job. On the other hand, the hump-shaped pattern is
16These studies include Black (1981), Kahn and Low (1984), Holzer (1987), and Parsons (1991) for the
US and Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994) for the UK. The last paper also uses the LFS, but the authors do
not look into the underlying reasons for OJS.
13consistent with initial learning about the match quality and selection over time, which is also
emphasized by Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994), although they do not distinguish between
diﬀerent reasons for OJS.
Next, panel (b) reports the relationship with ﬁrm size. The pattern is not as strong as in
the case of tenure. However, the probabilities of OJS show an upward tendency with respect
to ﬁrm size up to the 250-499 category. The upward tendency is stronger for unsatisﬁed OJS.
Note that this result disagrees, at least within the categories of ﬁrm sizes less than 500, with
the idea that workers at smaller ﬁrms are more likely to search in oder to gain employment
at a larger ﬁrm.17 Where is this increasing OJS probabilities with ﬁrm size coming from,
especially for unsatisﬁed OJS? To shed more light on this, I reestimate the multinomial logit
regression with ﬁve (instead of four) outcomes where unsatisﬁed OJS is further split into
those who are unsatisﬁed with pay and those who are unsatisﬁed with other aspects of their
job.
4.1.1 Unsatisﬁed with Pay vs. Unsatisﬁed with Other Aspects
Figure 3 presents predicted OJS probabilities for these two unsatisﬁed OJS groups by tenure
(panel(a)) and by ﬁrm size (panel (b)). The former exercise could potentially be revealing if
one expects that the learning story, mentioned above, applies more to nonpecuniary aspects
of a job (ﬁrm culture, colleagues, etc), as mentioned by Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994).
The results in the panel are weak along this dimension. It is, however, true that the hump-
shape is somewhat more pronounced for the probabilities of being unsatisﬁed with other
aspects, at least at the point estimates.
These two OJS outcomes diﬀer somewhat more signiﬁcantly across the ﬁrm-size dimen-
sion. In particular, the hump-shape pattern that comes out when the two outcomes are
treated as one is entirely accounted for by OJS due to unsatisﬁed with other aspects. On
the other hand, the probability of OJS for pay reasons are ﬂat or downward across ﬁrm size.
The latter result makes sense if larger ﬁrms pay more. The former result also makes sense if
there are more workers unsatisﬁed with their work environment at larger organizations.
5 Implications on Wages
I now turn to the analysis of the implications of OJS on wages. An inﬂuential contribution
by Topel and Ward (1992) ﬁnds the importance of job-to-job transitions in accounting for
earnings growth, especially early in workers’ career. They also argue that their ﬁndings are
strongly consistent with labor search models with OJS. In the following analysis, I examine
how OJS and associated job-to-job transitions are related to a worker’s wage growth. I also
attempt to infer the eﬀect of OJS on stayers’ wages. I ﬁrst review some leading theories of
OJS that navigate the empirical speciﬁcations below.
17As mentioned in footnote 15, the ﬁrm-size category in the LFS is capped at 500+, thus I cannot determine
if OJS probabilities decline sharply when the 500+ category is divided further.
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Figure 4: Predicted Unsatisﬁed OJS by Firm Tenure and Size
Notes: Predicted average probabilities for each group of workers. Bars around lines represent the
95% conﬁdence intervals. See also notes to Table 5.
5.1 Literature Review: OJS Theories
One branch of the recent literature has evolved from Burdett and Mortensen (1998) who
develop a random on-the-job search model; in their model, ﬁrms post and commit wages ex
ante (i.e., before the match is formed) and workers who happen to receive the oﬀer decide
whether to accept it or not. The worker makes a job-to-job transition if and only if the
oﬀered wage is higher than the wage earned at the present ﬁrm. In this model, while a
job-to-job transition is directly tied to wage gains, on-the-job search has no consequence on
stayers, whether they did not receive an oﬀer or turned down the oﬀer received. Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2002) relax this last assumption and develop the so-called sequential
auction model. The key extension is that it allows employers to make counteroﬀers when
an employee receives an outside oﬀer. When a worker receives an outside oﬀer, the two
employers bid against each other (i.e., Bertrand bidding war), and which employer wins the
bid depends on the relative productivity levels of the two employers. The model oﬀers two
new insights relative to the original Burdett-Mortensen model that are relevant to this paper.
First, it generates job-to-job movers that accept lower wages at a new ﬁrm.18 Second, workers
who receive an outside oﬀer that could have resulted in a job-to-job transition without the
possibility of a counteroﬀer may decide to stay with the current employer as a result of
the pay raise. One reason for the latter result being important is that it is consistent
with an upward-sloping wage-tenure proﬁle. Human capital theory interprets the positively
sloped wage-tenure proﬁle as resulting from accumulation of match-speciﬁc human capital.
However, according to the sequential auction model, it reﬂects the competitive pressure
18This situation arises when an outside oﬀer comes from a ﬁrm with higher productivity. The worker may
accept the lower pay, counting on future wage increases at the more productive ﬁrm, which could result from
outside oﬀers received at the new ﬁrm.
15between the two employers making oﬀers to the worker.19 Cahuc et al. (2006) modify the
wage setting mechanism in the sequential auction model. They consider an environment
in which the wage of the worker with an outside oﬀer is determined by the three-party
bargaining mechanism instead of the Bertrand competition between the two employers. The
two implications discussed above with respect to the wage evolution of movers and stayers
continue to hold in this model. Below I use the term “counteroﬀer model” to refer to this
class of models.
Another branch of the OJS literature assumes that wages are determined by continuously
renegotiated Nash bargaining without the possibility of commitment to future wages. In
this class of models, ﬁrms do not respond to outside oﬀers given the lack of commitment.
Furthermore, in negotiating with the new ﬁrm at the time of receiving an outside oﬀer, the
bargaining position of the worker is to become unemployed. Given this environment, job-to-
job transitions always result in wage gains. More speciﬁcally, Mortensen (1994), Pissarides
(2000, chap. 4) and Ramey (2008) assume that new jobs are created at the highest possible
level of idiosyncratic job productivity and thus on-the-job seekers always accept any outside
oﬀers they receive. Some papers renounce this rather stark assumption. For example, Krause
and Lubik (2006) and Tasci (2007) develop models with two types of jobs, good jobs and
bad jobs, and only the workers with bad jobs search for employment at a good job. Barlevy
(2002) studies a similar but more general and realistic environment with many types of job
matches. In his model, workers can reject oﬀers from low paying jobs and move up the
ladder of job matches over time as they move to better matches. Qualitatively, the same
implication on the wage transition applies to all these models.20 One implication that arises
in this class of models, under the assumption that a worker’s search decision is contractible,
is that the worker’s OJS itself lowers the wage at the current ﬁrm. That is because OJS
introduces a possibility that the worker leaves the ﬁrm, in which case the value of the job is
lost.21 This last implication is directly testable with the data the LFS provides. Below I use
the term “bargaining model” to refer to this class of models.
5.2 More on the Data
The analysis in the previous sections relied on the two-quarter longitudinal data of the
LFS. However, in the LFS, respondents report earnings only in the ﬁrst interview and last
(ﬁfth) interview. The ONS provides the ﬁve-quarter longitudinal data set with population
weights calculated for this data set. I therefore use this data set for the analysis in this
19Burdett and Coles (2003) and Shi (2009) also extend the Burdett and Mortensen model and derive an
upward-sloping wage-tenure proﬁle as an optimal contract. But these papers do not allow ﬁrms to make
a counteroﬀer and thus receiving an outside oﬀer per se does not cause a pay raise even when the worker
decides to stay at the current ﬁrm.
20One exception is a paper by Nagypal (2007) who adopts Nash bargaining for the wage determination
as well, but in her model, jobs diﬀer only with respect to their amenity values. Making several assumptions
regarding the bargaining protocol, she obtains the result that wage is independent of the amenity value and
hence is the same for all workers. That is, her model provides no meaningful implications for either the wage
transition itself or the trade-oﬀ between nonpecuniary and pecuniary aspects of a job.
21See Pissarides (2000, chap. 4) for a formal analysis on this point.
16section. To avoid changes in hours worked from aﬀecting the results, I use hourly wage as a
measure of earnings. I deﬂate it by the CPI to obtain real hourly wages. My entire data set
consists of 26 overlapping panels, each of which starts every quarter between 2002Q2 and
2008Q3 and covers every ﬁve-quarter period from each starting quarter.22 As in the analysis
in the previous section, I focus on male workers who are 25 years of age or older. The
following regression analysis always uses a ﬁrst-diﬀerence speciﬁcation, where the dependent
variable is the log real wage change. To avoid outliers from aﬀecting the results, I exclude
the observations that correspond to the top and bottom 1% of the distribution of log wage
changes. All regression results below include time dummies along with other variables, which
I discuss below.
5.3 Stayers
This subsection focuses on the workers that are employed at the same ﬁrm throughout
the ﬁve-quarter survey period. The regressions are guided by the theoretical implications
discussed above. I start with the following simple Mincer-style wage regression.




ijt + β1yit + β2y
2
it + εijt, (2)
where wijt refers to the real hourly wage of an individual i at a ﬁrm j at time t, µi represents
the time-invariant worker-speciﬁc component, γij represents the time-invariant ﬁrm-speciﬁc
component, θij refers to the match-speciﬁc component, α1 and α2 measure the eﬀects of ﬁrm
tenure xijt, β1 and β2 measure the eﬀects of age yit, and εijt is the error term.
5.3.1 Bargaining Model
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation I consider is motivated by the implication of the OJS models with
Nash bargaining. As mentioned above, the theory predicts that the wages of job seekers are
lower than those who are not searching. This can be directly addressed by the information
in the LFS. Augmenting equation (2) with a dummy variable indicating the worker’s search
status results in:




ijt + β1yit + β2y
2
it + δSit + εijt, (3)
where Sit is the dummy variable indicating worker’s search status (i.e., 1 if engaging in OJS
and 0 otherwise). Of course, I could consider several diﬀerent speciﬁcations with respect to
reasons of OJS. Speciﬁcally, I consider three diﬀerent reasons of OJS: (i) unsatisﬁed with
pay, (ii) unsatisﬁed with other aspects, and (iii) for other reasons. I exclude afraid OJS
because this situation is outside of the existing theories. First, I estimate the regression,
which includes all of the three cases as one dummy variable. Second, I lump together the
ﬁrst two cases as “unsatisﬁed search” to focus on the group of workers who appear to have
clear reasons for OJS. In this second speciﬁcation, δSit is replaced by δuSu
it where Su
it takes
1 when workers engage in OJS for reasons either (i) or (ii) above. Lastly, the three reasons
22The last interview of the last panel is, therefore, conducted in 2009Q4.
17Table 6: Wage Regressions: Stayers (Bargaining)












# of Obs. 33,480 33,480 33,480 2,542 2,542 2,542
ˆ R2 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.019 0.019 0.019
Notes: Results of the regressions expressed by equation (4). Top 1% and bottom 1%
of wage growth are excluded. Estimates for the constant term, ˆ α, and ˆ β are suppressed.
δs are coeﬃcients on dummies for OJS with various reasons. δ: OJS total (excl. afraid
search), δu: OJS unsatisﬁed (pay plus other aspects), δp: OJS unsatisﬁed with pay, δnp:
OJS unsatisﬁed with other aspects, δr: OJS other reasons. Columns (4) through (6)
restrict the samples to those who report changes in the ﬁrm-size categories between the
ﬁrst interview and ﬁfth interview. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Stars next
to point estimates indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10%(*) levels.
enter the regression separately, in which case δSit is replaced by δpS
p
it+δnpSnp+δrSr, where
superscripts p, np, and r, respectively, represent (i) unsatisﬁed with pay, (ii) unsatisﬁed with
other aspects, and (iii) other reasons. Taking the ﬁrst diﬀerence of equation (3) conveniently
eliminates all time-invariant components, resulting in the following simple expression:
∆lnwijt+1 = c + ˆ αxijt + ˆ βyijt + δ∆Sit+1 + ∆εijt+1 (4)
where c ≡ α1+α2+β1+β2 and ˆ α ≡ 2α2 and ˆ β ≡ 2β2. Note that ∆Sit+1 takes three possible
values {−1,0,1} depending on the transition in the search status of worker i. Consistently
estimating δ requires E(∆Sit+1∆εijt+1) = 0, which is unlikely to be is met. I will come back
to this issue shortly. But let me ﬁrst discuss the results from the OLS regressions that are
presented in the ﬁrst three columns of Table 6. Note that Equation (4) attempts to identify
δs by using the cross-sectional variations in the changes in OJS status.
First, when one search dummy variable lumping all three reasons together is included in
the regression (ﬁrst column), OJS reduces real hourly wage by 1% relative to the group of
workers who never searched during the entire interview period. In the second column where
I include one dummy representing unsatisﬁed OJS, the negative impact is even larger. The
18third column, where I split the unsatisﬁed group into two separate subgroups, shows that
there is not much diﬀerence in hourly earnings whether the worker is unsatisﬁed with pay
or with nonpecuniary aspects of their job. These results are consistent with the implication
of the bargaining model discussed above.
However, one can easily suspect that this result comes from the eﬀect that wage growth
causes changes in the search status: higher (lower) wage growth causes workers to stop (start)
searching, thus making the error term be correlated with changes in the search status. Of
particular importance with respect to this problem are changes in the ﬁrm conditions between
the two interview dates. In the context of the regressions I estimate, this problem can be
traced as an omission of the time-varying ﬁrm component in equation (3). Because the LFS is
a household survey, it is diﬃcult to control this eﬀect in my regression analysis. However, as
I did in the previous sections, I can use the ﬁrm-size variable in the LFS for this purpose. In
the LFS, however, the ﬁrm size is reported as a categorical variable rather than a continuous
variable, and the choices specify only somewhat coarse ﬁrm-size intervals. This implies that
simply adding this information to the regression is unlikely to solve the issue, given that the
majority of changes in ﬁrm size can be occurring within each interval. Instead, I reestimate
the regressions using the subsample, which consists of only workers that report changes in
ﬁrm-size categories between the two interviews. This allows me to focus on the workers who
potentially experience relatively large changes in wages (if the ﬁrm size is a good indicator
of wages) and then ask if the search status has any additional predictive power on wages.
Speciﬁcally, for each of the ﬁrst and ﬁfth survey quarter, I classify the number of employees
at each worker’s workplace as being in one of the three categories: (i) 1-249, (ii) 250-499,
or (iii) 500 or more. Then I estimate the regression, including only the workers who moved
from one ﬁrm-size class category to another.23
The results based on this restricted sample are shown in the third through sixth columns
of Table 6. As suspected, all coeﬃcients turn insigniﬁcant, although the point estimates still
show negative signs. Observe that all of the point estimates are larger (in absolute value)
than corresponding estimates from the full sample regressions. These results appear to be
consistent with the causality running from wage changes to the search status. For example,
a ﬁrm facing large declines in demand may reduce its ﬁrm size, but to the extent that it is an
imperfect measure of the time-varying ﬁrm component, the remaining part may be picked
up by the changes in the workers’ search status.
5.3.2 Counteroﬀer Model
Next, I try to test the implications of the counteroﬀer model for the wage growth of stayers.
The main challenge is that the LFS does not have the information on whether or not a
worker received oﬀers. Nor does it include the information on the oﬀered wage or a worker’s
23I also consider another categorization (i) 1-24, (ii) 25-49, and (iii) 50 or more. This alternative categoriza-
tion yields roughly the same results. The original questionnaire in the LFS speciﬁes somewhat more detailed
categorical choices with unequal distances between the categories. I reclassify them into three categories so
that the ﬁrst two categories have equal intervals.
19reservation wage.24 In other words, we do not know if those stayers in my sample indeed
received oﬀers and rejected them. Despite this weakness, the worker’s search status provides
a useful piece of information: I can identify the stayers who have a recent history of OJS.
Speciﬁcally, among the stayers, I select the workers who searched in either the ﬁrst one, two,
or three quarter(s) and then never searched in the subsequent four, three, and two quarters,
respectively. The idea is to select the group of workers that stayed after OJS. Remember that
the analysis in Section 3 showed that the job-to-job transition rate of the on-the-job seekers
is dramatically higher than those without OJS. It is therefore quite likely that the job oﬀer
arrival rates for the on-the-job seekers are also higher than for those without OJS. Also note
that by selecting those who report continuous OJS and subsequent continuous no search, I
exclude those workers who engage in OJS randomly (e.g., a worker who searches in the ﬁrst
and third quarters). Then I ask the following question: Are stayers with a recent history
of continuous OJS activity systematically paid better than those who did not search? The
answer to this question would be “yes” in OJS models with the possibility of counteroﬀers.
I am interested in whether this prediction is strong enough to show up in a representative
data set like the LFS. The regressions that I estimate take the following form:
∆lnwijt+1 = c + ˆ αxijt + ˆ βyijt + ρCit + ∆εijt+1, (5)
where the same notation as in equation (4) applies except Cit, which is the dummy variable
selecting workers with continuous OJS followed by no search, described above. Again, I
exclude workers who engage in OJS due to a fear of losing their job. As in equation (4), I
consider two other alternative speciﬁcations similar to the previous bargaining model: (i) one
that includes only unsatisﬁed OJS workers, identiﬁed by Cu
i , and (ii) the other that include
the three dummy variables corresponding to the three diﬀerent reasons for OJS, replacing
ρCit with ρpC
p
it + ρnpCnp + ρrCr.
The results are presented in Table 7. In the ﬁrst column, the OJS-to-no-OJS transition is
associated with a 1.2% gain in hourly wage on average relative to those who never searched on
the job during their interview period. However, this estimate is not statistically signiﬁcant.
In the next regression, presented in the second column, I exclude those who searched for
“other reasons” to focus on the unsatisﬁed group. Excluding this group not only raises the
size of the wage gain to 2.3%, but it also makes the point estimate statistically signiﬁcant at
the 5% level. The third column presents the results from a regression that includes dummies
for three groups separately. In this case, the point estimates of the ﬁrst two coeﬃcients ρp
and ρnp are at levels in line with the previous regression, and the coeﬃcient on “OJS for
other reasons” is essentially zero. Interestingly, when the unsatisﬁed OJS group is split into
two subgroups, neither of them are statistically signiﬁcant.
One concern similar to the one discussed with respect to the bargaining model is that
the transition from search to no search may be induced by other factors that result in wage
gains. One plausible suspect is, again, changing ﬁrm-level conditions. I address this issue by
estimating the same regressions using the subsample of workers who report that ﬁrm size has
24One data source that provides such valuable information is the 1981 panel of the NLSY. See Holzer
(1987) for the analysis that uses this data set. But this data set has other limitations for my purposes.
20Table 7: Wage Regressions: Stayers (Counteroﬀer Model)












# of Obs. 30,290 30,290 30,290 3,207 3,207 3,207
ˆ R2 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.050 0.050 0.052
Notes: Results of the regressions expressed by equation (5). Top and bottom 1%
of the wage growth distribution are excluded. Estimates for the constant term, ˆ α,
and ˆ β are suppressed. ρs are coeﬃcients on dummies for workers who quit searching
after OJS. ρ: OJS total (excl. afraid search), ρu: OJS unsatisﬁed (pay plus other
aspects), ρp: OJS unsatisﬁed with pay, ρnp: OJS unsatisﬁed with other aspects, ρr:
OJS other reasons. Speciﬁcations (4) through (6) restrict the samples to those who
report that their ﬁrm-size category changed to a larger category between the ﬁrst
interview and ﬁfth interview. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Stars next
to point estimates indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10%(*)
levels.
increased between the ﬁrst and ﬁfth interviews. This is done by identifying those who move
up the seven ﬁrm-size categories.25 The results with this restricted sample are presented in
the third through sixth columns of Table 7. Overall, as expected, the conditioning makes
positive relationships statistically weaker. In particular, the statistical signiﬁcance when
I focus on the unsatisﬁed OJS group goes away when the regression uses the sample of
employees at expanding ﬁrms. One anomalistic observation is that, when the three OJS
groups separately enter in the regression, the coeﬃcient on those who are unsatisﬁed with
nonpecuniary aspects shows a large positive number and becomes statistically signiﬁcant.
25These categories are (i) 1 − 10, (ii) 11−19, (iii) 20−24, (iv) 25−49, (v) 50−249, (vi) 250−499, and (vii)
500 or more. In the previous section, the conditioning was symmetric in the sense that I consider both
increase and decline in the ﬁrm size. But for the regressions in this section, the appropriate conditioning is
to consider only the increases in ﬁrm size.
215.3.3 Summary: Stayers
In sum, the results from the stayers’ regressions suggest that the predictions of the theories
sketched at the beginning of this section are supported, at best, only weakly. While naive
OLS regressions can pick up the correlation that is consistent with the theoretical predictions,
the relationships become weaker or vanish when the sample is restricted to control for the
time-varying ﬁrm eﬀects.
The prediction of the Nash bargaining model is that wages reﬂect whether or not workers
engage in OJS. One can think of many possibilities that invalidate this prediction. For
example, some form of wage rigidity makes it diﬃcult for wages to reﬂect the OJS activity.
The observability of the OJS activity that underlies the prediction is also questionable.
Similarly, I ﬁnd little evidence that “oﬀer matching” is a pervasive phenomenon. This ﬁnding
is consistent with the anecdotal evidence that the “no-response” policy is dominant in the
labor market. An often-mentioned theoretical reason of why this is so is that oﬀer matching
encourages ineﬃcient rent seeking OJS, as pointed out by a seminal work by Mortensen
(1978).26
5.4 Job-to-Job Movers
I move on to estimating regressions that include job-to-job movers in the sample. The
intention is to measure the eﬀects of a job-to-job transition on wage growth relative to that
of stayers. Remember that the previous section analyzed the wage diﬀerentials among stayers
depending on whether a worker engaged in OJS or not. Here I exclude those who have any
experience of OJS during the interview period. The comparison group is, therefore, always
those who never engage in OJS during the entire interview period.
5.4.1 Some Speciﬁcation Issues
I start with the wage equation (2) except that I drop the square terms to simplify the
notation. The results below are little aﬀected by omitting the square terms. The log wage
change of a job-to-job mover i working at a ﬁrm k in t + 1 is written as:
lnwikt+1 − lnwijt = β + γk − γj + θik − θij − αxijt + εikt+1 − εijt. (6)
Combining this with the corresponding wage growth equation for stayers results in:
lnwikt+1 − lnwijt = β + (γk − γj)Ji + (θik − θij)Ji + α[1 − Ji(xijt + 1)] + εikt+1 − εijt (7)
where Ji is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 when j  = k and 0 when j = k. The ﬁrst
term on the right hand side measures the eﬀect of age on wage growth. The second term
26My ﬁnding, of course, does not exclude the possibility of oﬀer matching in certain occupations or
industries. The evidence presented by Barron et al. (2006) shows that more than 40% of personnel managers
and business owners who are surveyed say that they consider counteroﬀers. However, this number is based
on the survey to employers (not to employees) and thus represents the possibility of counteroﬀers to any
employees within a ﬁrm. The number of workers who actually receive counteroﬀers can be substantially
smaller.
22γk − γj measures the diﬀerences in the ﬁrm eﬀect. This term is zero when the worker stays
in the same ﬁrm.27 Similarly, the third term drops out for stayers and reﬂects the change
in the match-speciﬁc component. The last term captures the eﬀect due to the ﬁrm tenure
reset to zero when a job-to-job transition occurs, otherwise reﬂects an additional year of ﬁrm
tenure.
To distinguish between the changes in the ﬁrm component and the match-speciﬁc com-
ponent, I approximate the ﬁrm eﬀect by the ﬁrm-size variable. I can then identify the
improvement (or deterioration) of the match quality θik − θij through the incidence of job-
to-job transitions. There are seven ﬁrm-size categories in the LFS as mentioned above. Let
flt be a dummy variable taking a value 1 when a worker is in the ﬁrm-size category l in
period t. I can then rewrite equation (7) as:
lnwikt+1 − lnwijt = β +
7 X
l=2
φl(flt+1 − flt)Ji + λJi + α[1 − Ji(xijt + 1)] + εikt+1 − εijt (8)
where λ ≡ θik − θij. Note that the terms inside the summation identify the ﬁrm eﬀect
using the information on the changes in ﬁrm-size categories before and after the job-to-job
transition. For those who stay in the same size category, flt+1 −flt = 0 for all l. The worker
who changes the size category has 1 in the category that he moves into, −1 in the category
that he moves out from, and 0 in the remaining four categories.
My main interest in this section is in the estimates of λ. As I did in the previous section,
I split the movers into several diﬀerent groups. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation distinguishes only
those who made a job-to-job transition with and without OJS, whose eﬀects are measured
by λnsSns and λsSs, respectively. The second speciﬁcation splits the OJS group into three
subgroups whose eﬀects are summarized by the terms: λaSa (afraid OJS), λuSu (unsatisﬁed
OJS), and λrSs (OJS for other reasons). The third speciﬁcation further splits the unsatisﬁed
OJS group into those who are unsatisﬁed with pay and those who are unsatisﬁed with other
aspects of their job, measured by λpSp and λnpSns, respectively. Successively splitting the
sample into smaller groups allows me to tease out heterogeneity involved in the diﬀerent
types of OJS.
5.4.2 Results
Table 8 presents the results. The ﬁrst column presents the results when job-to-job transi-
tions are split only into two groups, those with and without OJS. This regression does not
include the ﬁrm-size variables. First of all, the result conﬁrms the idea that the job-to-job
transitions play a role in improving the worker’s earnings. The job-to-job transition raises
a worker’s wage by 4% to 6% (relative to the wage growth of stayers who never search).
More speciﬁcally, the interpretation in the context of my regression is that the match quality
27I mentioned in the regressions for stayers the issue of omitting the time-varying ﬁrm eﬀects in the wage
equation (2). This assumption is maintained here, and thus this term is zero when the worker stays at
the same ﬁrm. However, when a job-to-job transition occurs, this term is in general nonzero, reﬂecting the
diﬀerence in time-invariant ﬁrm eﬀects.
23Table 8: Wage Regressions: Movers
Parameters (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
λns 0.044∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
λs 0.059∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗
(0.013) (0.014)
λa −0.050∗ −0.043∗ −0.050∗ −0.042







λr 0.091∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
φ2 −0.009 −0.008 −0.009
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
φ3 0.025 0.023 0.023
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
φ4 0.017 0.016 0.016
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
φ5 0.064∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
φ6 0.069∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
φ7 0.081∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
β 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# of Obs. 34,427 31,365 34,427 31,365 34,427 31,365
ˆ R2 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010
Notes: λ’s measure eﬀects of job-to-job transitions relative to job stayers (with no
history of OJS). λns: no search, λs: OJS (total), λa: OJS afraid, λu: OJS unsatisﬁed
(total), λup: OJS unsatisﬁed with pay, λup: OJS unsatisﬁed with other aspects, λr: OJS
other reasons. φ’s measure ﬁrm-size ﬁxed eﬀects relative to the smallest size category
(1-10 workers) using the changes of ﬁrm size associated with job-to-job transitions. φ2:
11−19, φ3: 20−24, φ4: 25−49, φ5: 50−249, φ6: 250−499, and φ7: 500+. β measures
the ﬁrm-tenure eﬀect. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
24improves upon the job-to-job transitions, which is consistent with Topel and Ward’s (1992)
claim. The result indicates that a job-to-job transition with OJS is associated with larger
wage gains on average, although the diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant. This ﬁnd-
ing is interesting for a couple of reasons. First, it is consistent with the idea that OJS is
“directed.” One can imagine an environment in which OJS is costless but ﬁnding a good
match involves directing job search into jobs that are suitable for a worker’s skills or other
characteristics, in which case job-to-job transitions with OJS result in larger wage gains.
The second possibility is that OJS is costly (which is logically a plausible presumption).
In this case, wage gains associated with OJS job-to-job transitions should reﬂect this cost.
Lastly, the fact that job-to-job transitions without OJS are associated with smaller wage
gains may be considered surprising if one views them as resulting from headhunting, where
talented workers move to high-paying jobs without explicit OJS. The result here suggests
that such anecdotal evidence is not warranted at least in the representative sample such as
the LFS. Distinguishing these stories is beyond the scope of this paper but splitting OJS
job-to-job transitions into diﬀerent reasons shed some further light on the point. The second
column adds the ﬁrm-size variables to the regressions. This is important in that wage gains
associated with job-to-job transitions may reﬂect that workers are moving from smaller ﬁrms
to larger ﬁrms (which pay more). The result indeed indicates the presence of the ﬁrm-size
eﬀects. In particular, the coeﬃcients on the largest three ﬁrm-size categories show statisti-
cally signiﬁcant positive eﬀects. Adding the ﬁrm-size variables, however, hardly aﬀects the
coeﬃcients on job-to-job transitions, suggesting that the improvement of job-match quality
plays an important role in the worker wage proﬁle beyond changes in the ﬁrm eﬀect.
The third and fourth columns present the results when OJS workers are split into the
three groups, respectively, with and without ﬁrm-size information. Large heterogeneity exists
between the three groups in terms of the eﬀects of OJS. In particular, OJS caused by to
fear of losing a job is accompanied by signiﬁcant wage losses (5%). Of course, this makes
sense given that the outside option for these workers is to become unemployed. There is
long-standing literature on the earnings losses of job losers (or displaced workers) pioneered
by Ruhm (1991) and Jacobson et al. (1993). The result here collaborates well with this
literature.28 Also note that the existing theoretical literature on OJS has had a diﬃcult time
in accounting for wage losses upon job-to-job transitions that exist in the data. For example,
one of the key themes of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) is to develop a model of OJS that
generates earnings losses upon job-to-job transitions. Their model indeed generates wage
losses through diﬀerences in ﬁrm productivity, but this mechanism fails to generate enough
“negative” job-to-job transitions observed in their data. A similar idea is also explored by
Connolly and Gottschalk (2008). The point of these existing papers is that even though a
worker accepts a job that pays less, a present discounted value of earnings from the new
job should be higher. This statement does not need to hold for those who make job-to-job
transitions as a result of fear of losing their job. Remember that a nontrivial fraction of
28The average earnings losses here appear much smaller than those reported in these earlier studies. But
this is not surprising. These earlier studies often consider the displaced workers, which represent a more
limited group of workers that are most adversely aﬀected by their job losses.
25Table 9: Unconditional Wage Growth Distributions
Percentiles Mean Share of
25% 50% 75% ∆lnw < 0
No search −0.131 0.027 0.199 0.026 0.451
Afraid −0.271 −0.021 0.117 −0.080 0.535
Unsatisﬁed (pay) −0.037 0.126 0.276 0.089 0.305
Unsatisﬁed (other) −0.119 0.031 0.221 0.054 0.456
Other reasons −0.082 0.054 0.239 0.059 0.376
Notes: Based on the sample of 2,511 job-to-job transitions. See Subsection 5.2 for
more information about the data.
on-the-job seekers report this as a main reason for OJS, which is clearly one of the reasons
for the “negative” job-to-job transitions.
The opposite side of the negative job-to-job transitions is that when workers report that
they are unsatisﬁed with their current jobs, they enjoy larger wage gains, which amount to
7% to 8%, depending on whether the ﬁrm-size variables are included or not. The diﬀerences
from no-search job-to-job movers expand to 3-4 percentage points. It is somewhat puzzling
that OJS with “other reasons” results in larger gains than the unsatisﬁed group. This
puzzling result largely disappears as I reﬁne the speciﬁcation, as I discuss shortly.
The ﬁfth and sixth columns further split the unsatisﬁed OJS group into the two sub-
groups. This highlights another important heterogeneity underlying the average wage gains
associated with job-to-job transitions. That is, these two groups are associated with consid-
erably diﬀerent outcomes in terms of wage gains upon job-to-job transitions; when workers
are unsatisﬁed with pay, wage gains amount to 10%, whereas when workers are unhappy with
nonpecuniary aspects, earnings gains are reduced to roughly 6%. Again, this result is not
surprising, yet important in that it suggests imperfect substitutability between pecuniary
and nonpecuniary aspects of labor turnover: workers may accept a lower wage oﬀer as far as
overall job satisfaction is expected to improve. Note that the importance of nonpecuniary
aspects of a job may be another reason for wage cuts upon job-to-job transitions, which is
discussed above.
To see this last issue more explicitly, Table 9 presents the unconditional wage growth
distributions as well as the share of those who experience wage losses upon a job-to-job
transition. First, note that job-to-job movers with a fear of losing their job suﬀer the
largest wage cuts as expected. The fraction of the incidence of the wage cuts is 53%. The
wage growth distribution dramatically improves when workers make job-to-job transitions
explicitly for improving their pay. Not only are wage gains larger at all percentiles but also
the fraction of the wage cuts is much lower at 31%. Relative to these workers, wage gains are
much more muted when workers are unhappy about nonpecuniary aspects. A much larger
fraction of workers (46%) accept wage cuts. The labor search literature has put much less
emphasis on the importance of nonpecuniary aspects in the job acceptance decision. As
26Table 10: Wage Regressions: Movers (with Industry and Occupation Dummies)
Parameters (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
λns 0.040∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
λs 0.053∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014)
λa −0.046∗ −0.041 −0.047∗ −0.041







λr 0.076∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
φ2 −0.011 −0.010 −0.011
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
φ3 0.027 0.025 0.025
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
φ4 0.018 0.017 0.017
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
φ5 0.066∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
φ6 0.070∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
φ7 0.086∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
β 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# of Obs. 34,397 31,336 34,397 31,336 34,397 31,336
ˆ R2 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.013
Notes: See notes to Table 8. Industries included: agriculture and ﬁshing, energy and wa-
ter, manufacturing, construction, distribution, hotels and restaurants, transport and com-
munication, banking, ﬁnance and insurance, public administration, education and health,
and other services. Occupations included: managers and senior oﬃcials; professional oc-
cupations; associate professional and technical occupations; administrative and secretarial
occupations; skilled trades occupations; personal service occupations; sales and customer
service occupation; process, plant, and machine operatives; and elementary occupations.
27mentioned above, Nagypal (2007) develops a model in which jobs are heterogeneous with
respect to their amenity values. However, the particular wage determination mechanism does
not allow for the two margins to interact with each other. There are a few notable recent
papers that take the nonpecuniary aspects of a job seriously. Nosal and Rupert (2007)
develop a model that explicitly includes job amenity in the worker’s job acceptance decision.
This paper is largely theoretical but presents an interesting piece of empirical evidence based
on the PSID: The data do not appear to support the idea that the wage growth of those
who accepted wage losses upon job changes increases over the subsequent years, which is a
prediction of the theories by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Connolly and Gottschalk
(2008). Nosal and Rupert (2007) argue that their ﬁnding implies imperfect substitutability
between amenity and wage. A recent paper by Bonhomme and Jolivet (forthcoming) develops
and estimates an OJS model in which the value of a job depends on job amenities as well
as wages. They ﬁnd strong inﬂuence of job amenities on job-to-job transitions. This paper’s
ﬁndings, along with these existing studies, point to a fruitful direction of future research.
In the regression (7), I did not take into account the fact that diﬀerent industries and
occupations have diﬀerent levels of wages. A concern similar to the one made with respect
to the ﬁrm-size eﬀect applies here as well: The pattern of job-to-job transitions may be
systematically correlated with interindustry or interoccupation wage diﬀerentials. I augment
(7) with industry and occupation dummies as I did to control for the ﬁrm-size eﬀect in (8).29
The same set of six regressions are estimated with industry and occupation dummies.
The results, which are presented in Table 10, are largely unaﬀected by the inclusion of
the industry and occupation dummies. One noticeable change is that coeﬃcients on OJS
for other reasons, λr, are reduced by roughly 1.5 percentage points when compared with
corresponding estimates in Table 8. This change makes the overall results more intuitive.
5.5 Some Implications for OJS Theory
Let me close this section by discussing the overall implications of my ﬁndings. Note that I
ﬁnd only weak (if any) evidence that OJS inﬂuences the wages of stayers, whereas the link
between OJS and movers’ wage transitions seems to be much tighter. The latter result is
clearly related to the fact that workers who engage in OJS for diﬀerent reasons have diﬀerent
reservation wages; the outside option for afraid on-the-job seekers is to become unemployed,
whereas it is plausible that, for those who are unsatisﬁed, the outside option is to stay with
the current employer until he receives an oﬀer that exceeds the continuation value of the
present job. Furthermore, the value of the job should be viewed as a bundle of pecuniary
and nonpecuniary components. Depending on whether the worker is unhappy about his pay
or other aspects, his reservation wage would diﬀer, aﬀecting observed outcomes diﬀerently.
Generally speaking, the inﬂuence of the worker’s outside options on the wage outcome goes
against the wage determination in the competitive labor market and instead suggests the
importance of frictions in labor reallocation.
29Each regression includes nine major industries and nine major occupations. See the notes to Table 10
for the list of industries and occupations.
28Note, however, that the above results are not necessarily entirely consistent with existing
search theories. For example, many macro models discussed in the second paragraph of
subsection 5.1 assume that starting wage at the time of the job-to-jobtransition is determined
by the Nash bargaining where the worker’s bargaining position is to become unemployed.
This last assumption is not consistent with the results for movers. This no-recall assumption
is made in order to avoid the three party bargaining in which the current employer, the
worker, and the prospective employer are involved in the bargaining process. As mentioned
before, Cahuc et al. (2006) have developed such a model. The problem of this route is
that the evidence on counteroﬀers in the data is weak. The results for stayers suggest some
form of rigidity in the existing employment relationship in responding to the changes in the
workers’ outside option. This may result from ﬁrms’ no matching policy to avoid rent-seeking
activities of its workers or from ﬁrms’ belief that making counteroﬀers to selected workers
may cause negative externalities to other workers, hurting the ﬁrm’s overall productivity.
6 Conclusion
Many competing theoretical models of OJS have been developed in recent years. This paper
is motivated by the fact that there is nevertheless little empirical work on OJS that provides a
set of easily comprehensible stylized facts. This paper has shown many new stylized facts on
OJS and job-to-job transitions, but there are several ﬁndings that appear worth mentioning
here again. The ﬁrst is the heterogeneity between diﬀerent groups of workers that engage
in OJS. In particular, I have emphasized the importance of distinction between workers
who are unsatisﬁed with pay and those who are unsatisﬁed with nonpecuniary aspects of
a job. Second, the evidence that ﬁrms respond to the outside oﬀer that their employee
receives is weak. Third, wages set upon job-to-job transitions have a tighter link with the
worker’s outside options. The latter two ﬁndings appear to suggest that wage setting is
more ﬂexible at the extensive margin than within the same ﬁrm and that search frictions
involved in job-to-job transitions make the bargaining element relevant. These ﬁndings call
for reexamination of the wage setting mechanism in the existing literature.
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